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TAX LAW AND THE ERODING
BUDGET PROCESS
REBECCA M. KYSAR*
I
INTRODUCTION
Tax scholars have long lamented the tendency of the budget process to
blemish tax policy. The budget process takes pristine tax concepts and subjects
them to its rules and gimmicks so that they are unrecognizable by the time they
leave Congress.1 The 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA), the largest overhaul
of the tax code since 1986, is an example of this phenomenon, with its many sunset
provisions, phase-ins, and revenue-forced policies.2
The relationship between tax and budget rules, however, is not unidirectional.
Increasingly, political pressures to enact tax legislation also impact the budget
process, with enduring consequences that sometimes reach beyond tax law. Most
recently, partisan conflict over the 2017 tax legislation challenged fundamental
aspects of the budget process—such as the length of budget windows, the
construction of budget baselines, even the independence of the estimators—in
order to fit the law through the requirements of the budget reconciliation process.
The succumbing of these fundamental features of the budget process to partisan
wrangling presents challenges for which the existing budget institutions were illdesigned to meet.
Lawmakers adhered to many of the budget process rules in a formal sense,
which could be viewed as demonstrating the resiliency of the budget process.
There is reason, however, to not be so optimistic. The budgetary disputes heavily
shaped the contours of the legislation, exacerbating the tendency of lawmakers
to disregard long-term fiscal concerns and contributing to revenue losses of $1.9
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1. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, Paint-by-Numbers Tax Lawmaking, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 609
(1995); Charles E. McLure, Jr., The Budget Process and Tax Simplification/Complication, 45 TAX L. REV.
25, 79 (1989) (arguing that reconciliation has contributed to complexity in tax legislation).
2. One consequence of the budget process rules is that the 2017 tax legislation actually has no title.
The Parliamentarian struck the provision that set forth its short name since this was a non-germane
amendment and therefore outside the scope of the reconciliation process. Dan Shaviro, The Act with No
Name, START MAKING SENSE BLOG (Dec. 21, 2017), http://danshaviro.blogspot.com/2017/12/the-actwith-no-name.html [https://perma.cc/J7G5-UVMW]. For convenience’s sake, I will refer to the bill using
its original short title, its subsequent omission from the actual legislation notwithstanding.
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trillion in the TCJA’s first ten years.3 Additionally, the extent to which the 2017
tax legislation challenged the budget process likely has eroded important budget
norms, casting doubt upon their staying power going forward. Thus, tax policy
has impacted budget policy by encouraging the ill-conceived use of reconciliation
to ease the passage of revenue-losing legislation, while also creating pressure for
Congress to unshackle itself from the budget process. This Article identifies
points of instability in the budget process and offers suggestions for improving
those areas in light of the new strains placed upon them.
Part II discusses the recent expansion of the budget reconciliation process and
accompanying budget gimmicks to accommodate ambitious tax legislation. Part
III examines the effect of TCJA upon the budget process and the latter’s impact
upon the enacted tax policy. It then offers possible ways to reduce the undesirable
consequences of these interactions. Part IV discusses general conclusions about
the state of the budget process and more ambitious reforms of it.
II
THE CHANGING BUDGET PROCESS
In the spring of 2017, Senate Republicans deployed the so called “nuclear
option” to remove the filibuster obstacle to confirming Supreme Court
nominees,4 thereby empowering the simple majority in an institution that has
traditionally privileged the rights of the minority party. This development may
have seemed like a paradigm shift from the Senate’s standing as the more
deliberative body, but the shift has not been sudden. Instead, the shift has been a
result of a long path of steady erosion of the filibuster.
The budget reconciliation process allows for the passage of legislation that
avoids a Senate filibuster.5 The scope of the process has expanded in the past few
decades to encompass large tax cuts and parts of health care reform.6 This
3. The original score for the bill was approximately $1.5 trillion. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX'N,
JCX-67-17, 115TH CONG., ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR
H.R. 1, THE “TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT” (Comm. Print 2017). CBO has since revised that figure to $1.9
trillion. CONG. BUDGET OFF., THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2018–2028, at 106 (April
2018).
4. Matt Flegenheimer, Senate Republicans Deploy ‘Nuclear Option’ to Clear Path for Gorsuch,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-supreme-courtsenate.html [https://perma.cc/M9CN-H6TG].
5. See Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C. § 310(e)(2) (2012),
93 Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297, 315 (1974); Anita S. Krishnakumar, Note, Reconciliation and the Fiscal
Constitution: The Anatomy of the 1995–96 Budget “Train Wreck,” 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 589, 593 (1998).
6. For general scholarly examinations of the reconciliation process, see JOHN B. GILMOUR,
RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES? 93–138 (1990); see also generally Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the
Structures of Decisionmaking in the Federal Budget Process, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 387 (1998); Philip G.
Joyce & Robert D. Reischauer, Deficit Budgeting: The Federal Budget Process and Budget Reform, 29
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 429 (1992); Krishnakumar, supra note 5; James A. Miller & James D. Range,
Reconciling an Irreconcilable Budget: The New Politics of the Budget Process, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 4
(1983). For a historical overview of the process, see ALLEN SCHICK, THE FEDERAL BUDGET: POLITICS,
POLICY, PROCESS 142–49 (3d ed. 2007). I have previously explored reconciliation in the tax reform
context in particular. Rebecca M. Kysar, Reconciling Congress to Tax Reform, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
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legislation would have otherwise failed due to a lack of bipartisan support. In
many ways, the expansion of the reconciliation process tracks increasing
obstructionism by the minority party. Reconciliation has become a release valve
for the legislative filibuster, perhaps allowing it to endure longer than it otherwise
would.
But reconciliation was not designed to accommodate such ambitious
legislative efforts. To fit such laws within reconciliation’s confines, the majority
party has had to employ several budgetary devices, which have consequences
upon the budget process. While the expansion of reconciliation has thus served
to preserve Senate tradition, it has come at a cost to the budget process. It also
reduces the prospect for serious tax reform. This Part outlines the history of
reconciliation as well as its present and likely future incarnations.
A. A Short History of Reconciliation
1. Original Goals and Early History
Although it has been modified several times, the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (hereafter, the Budget Act) serves as the
backbone for the congressional budget process.7 It was initiated as a means of
asserting and unifying Congressional authority over the budget, which had fallen
into the Executive Branch’s ambit with the President’s Budget and the
controversial impoundments by President Nixon.8 The Budget Act allows
Congress to formulate its own budget in a cohesive manner through the budget
resolution, as opposed to simply passing numerous appropriations bills every
year in an uncoordinated manner.9 The budget resolution introduces the budget
priorities and most major legislation that Congress plans to pursue in the fiscal
year, which runs from October 1 to September 30.
To help Congress meet the targets in the budget resolution, the Budget Act
created the Congressional Budget Office (the “CBO”), a nonpartisan agency
within the legislative branch that estimates the costs for legislative proposals. The
Budget Act also formed the budget committees in each house that draft the
budget resolution.10 Because majority party leaders control the budget
committees, the centralization of power in those committees has helped to give
rise to a new era in Congress—one of majoritarian politics as opposed to
dispersed committee power.11 The drafting of the budget resolution, not
surprisingly, is often contentious due to its importance in setting policy
priorities.12 Prior to fiscal year 1999, Congress passed a budget resolution
2121 (2013).
7. See generally Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.
8. SCHICK, supra note 6, at 119–20.
9. Id.
10. Congressional Budget Act and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 § 301.
11. Elizabeth Garrett, The Congressional Budget Process: Strengthening the Party-in-Government,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 716–24 (2000).
12. SCHICK, supra note 6, at 119–20.
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relatively on time. In more recent years, the process has stalled entirely, and the
budget resolution is not enacted at all.13
Reconciliation began as an ancillary part of the congressional budget process
to assist Congress in balancing the budget. In the Budget Act as originally
enacted, Congress had to revise budgetary targets in a second budget resolution
just prior to the new fiscal year.14 Unlike those set out in the first budget
resolution, these new targets were binding.15 The reconciliation process, by
removing the threat of filibuster and non-germane amendments, gave Congress
an expedited procedure to enact legislation that would bring the budget in
conformity with the new targets.16
Congress never quite used the reconciliation process as originally envisioned.
The first few years following the enactment of the Budget Act, the budget
committees delegated compliance with the goals of the second budget resolution
to the authorizing committees in a practice called “assumed legislative savings.”17
When this practice repeatedly failed to comply with the budget directives,
Democratic leaders embarked on a new path to balance the budget. In the spring
of 1980, they used the first budget resolution to enact reconciliation legislation
rather than waiting for the second.18 The bill cut entitlements and raised revenue,
resulting in a savings of $8.2 billion.19 By the early 1980s, Congress eliminated the
second budget resolution altogether. During this time period, Congress used this
new incarnation of reconciliation to enact several bills that cut deficits by a
significant degree.20
2. The Growing Influence of Reconciliation and the Byrd Rule
Reconciliation thus began as a deficit-decreasing device and was used as such
several times during the 1980s without much effect. When deficits still ballooned,
Congress enacted the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act of 1985, which mandated
sequestration if Congress failed to meet deficit reduction targets.21 Eventually,
the threat of sequestration proved too harsh, and Congress repealed the GrammRudman-Hollings Act in favor of pay-as-you-go rules and discretionary spending
caps in the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990.22
During the debate of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, Congress also
revisited the reconciliation process. Unhappy with the ability of members to add
unrelated amendments to reconciliation legislation, Senator Robert Byrd helped
13. Id. at 123.
14. Krishnakumar, supra note 5, at 592–93.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 593.
17. GILMOUR, supra note 6, at 105.
18. Id. at 108–09.
19. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, 94 Stat. 2599 (1980).
20. See Kysar, supra note 6, at 2129–30.
21. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037
(1985); see GILMOUR, supra note 6, at 185–86.
22. Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990).
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reform the process with the Senate “Byrd Rule.” The rule can be used to strike
provisions that are unrelated to the budget.23 These “extraneous provisions” are
defined to include those that do not produce a change in outlays or revenues.24
Once a Byrd Rule point of order is raised, it can be waived only by a three-fifths
vote of the Senate.25
The Byrd Rule has since been codified and expanded.26 The rule also forbids
reconciliation measures from increasing the deficit in a fiscal year beyond the
budget window.27 This change was in response to a controversy regarding
legislation that decreased deficits in the near-term but produced deficits in the
long-term—tax cuts (or spending increases) that sprung into life immediately
after the budget window period.
Reconciliation was used in the early 1990s under President Bill Clinton to
enact significant legislation without bipartisan support. The Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993 significantly raised taxes on the rich.28 The Byrd Rule,
however, was in full effect, and led to the removal of 150 extraneous provisions
from the legislation.29 The heightened influence of the Byrd Rule had a profound
effect on the resulting law, upsetting many members of the House who thought
the rule led to too much power in the Senate.30
During this era, when Republicans regained control of Congress, they tried
to use reconciliation to fulfill their campaign pledges in the Balanced Budget Act
of 1995, a reconciliation bill that dramatically cut taxes and entitlement
spending.31 Although President Clinton ultimately vetoed the bill, Republicans
again heavily invoked the Byrd Rule at the drafting and deliberation stages to
remove dozens of provisions.32
The Byrd Rule grew in importance in the 1990s. The minority party formally
invoked it over eighty times in that decade as compared to just five times in the
1980s.33 This increase likely reflects the more ambitious use of reconciliation to
pass social policy and the increasing divergence between the two political parties
during this time period.
As the deficits lifted in the late-1990s, Republicans tried to use the
reconciliation process to enact tax cuts that were not offset by decreases in
spending. In 1999, the budget resolution instructed the tax-writing committees to

23. BILL HENIFF, JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30862, THE BUDGET RECONCILIATION
PROCESS: THE SENATE’S “BYRD RULE” 2 (2016).
24. Id. at 5.
25. Id. at 4.
26. Id. at 3.
27. Id. at 5.
28. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993).
29. 139 CONG. REC. S19767 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1993) (remarks of Sen. Jim Sasser).
30. HENIFF, JR., supra note 23, at 13–14.
31. H.R. 2491, 104th Cong. (1st Sess. 1995) (as received in the Senate).
32. HENIFF, JR., supra note 23, at 22–24.
33. Id. at 10.
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report such a bill.34 At the time, the revenue-reducing legislation was expected to
lower budget surpluses.
The use of reconciliation in this manner became divisive in the Senate since
reconciliation had never been used other than to maintain or improve the
nation’s fiscal picture. Some Senators opposed the move, arguing that the original
intention of reconciliation was as a deficit-decreasing device. Others argued that
the actual language of the Budget Act simply prescribes that reconciliation bills
“change” spending and revenue.35 The better view is likely the former—the fast
track procedures enabled easier passage of legislation requiring tough votes—
that is, unpopular tax increases or spending cuts. It is difficult to imagine that
Congress instead enacted this apparatus to facilitate legislation that is relatively
easy to pass—that is, tax decreases or spending increases. That being said, the
“original intent” of Congress of course does not bind it going forward, and there
is nothing to prevent Congress from using the procedure for new purposes,
however short-sighted they are.
Ultimately, the Senate Parliamentarian would bless using reconciliation for
deficit-increasing legislation in a move that could be described as the “original
sin” that has produced many subsequent reconciliation-related controversies.36
For one, the Byrd Rule necessitated additional procedural maneuvers since it
prohibits legislation from increasing the deficit beyond the budget window
period. To meet the rigors of the Byrd Rule, drafters of the deficit-increasing
Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999 sunsetted the tax cut in 2009, keeping
its costs within the budget window period. Originally, the expiration was itself
only temporary, and the drafters reinstated the cuts after the sunset date.37 A
Byrd Rule point of order, however, struck the reinstatement of the cuts from the
bill, causing them to permanently sunset ten years after their enactment.38
President Clinton, however, vetoed the 1999 reconciliation bill.
In 2001, Republicans finally passed enormous reconciliation tax cuts into law
in the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
(EGTRRA).39 The cuts were initially sunsetted to meet the Byrd Rule, as well as
to keep the costs within the levels set forth in the reconciliation instructions.40
Some Senators again decried the use of reconciliation for anything other than
deficit-reducing measures. Senator Byrd argued that although the original
Budget Act did not delineate between tax increases and tax cuts, amendments to
it clarified that deficit-reduction was the goal.41 Many also protested the sunset
34.
35.
36.
37.

H.R. Con. Res. 68, 106th Cong. §§ 104–105 (1999).
HENIFF, JR., supra note 23, at 15.
Thanks to George Yin for this turn of phrase.
Michael W. Evans, The Budget Process and the ‘Sunset’ Provision of the 2001 Tax Law, 99 TAX
NOTES 405, 412 (2003).
38. Id. at 411.
39. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38
(2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
40. David Kamin, Basing Budget Baselines, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 143, 169–70 (2015).
41. 147 CONG. REC. S5651–52 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 2001) (remarks of Sen. Robert Byrd).
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provisions, arguing that the resulting disruptions to taxpayer planning would
erode the positive impact that the tax cuts would otherwise have upon
investment. Others were more optimistic, concluding that the sunsets would
provide an opportunity to reexamine policy at a later date in light of the nation’s
altered economic circumstances.42
Despite the mixed view on sunset provisions, Republicans used them again to
avoid the Byrd Rule in the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2003 (JGTRRA), which lowered rates on capital gains and dividends.43 When
Democrats regained control of Congress in 2007, both the House and Senate each
passed new procedural rules forbidding reconciliation bills that increased the
deficit or reduced surpluses, even within the budget window period.44 The
prohibition on reconciliation tax cuts, however, was short-lived. Once Congress
changed hands again, the Republicans eliminated the new rules.45
3. The Current and Future Eras: Reconciliation in Flux
a. Reconciliation and an eroding filibuster. The above history illustrates
the fluidity of the reconciliation process, as well as its contested boundaries. The
expansion of the process has not abated. In the period following the sunsetted
tax cuts, Democrats controversially used reconciliation to enact parts of major
health care reform in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).46
After winning both houses and the Presidency, Republicans repeatedly
attempted to use the process to repeal that reform in the early part of 2017.47
The majority party will likely continue to test the boundaries of reconciliation
to effectuate its legislative goals. The filibuster was previously invoked only in
extraordinary circumstances but now has become routine in the Senate, creating
a climate of minority obstructionism. Historically, when legislative tools have
stymied majority rule, the majority has eliminated them.48 Although a simple
42. HENIFF, JR., supra note 23, at 16.
43. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752 (2003)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
44. H.R. Res. 6, 110th Cong. (2007); S. Con. Res. 21, 110th Cong. (submitted as amended on May 8,
2007). See also Kysar, supra note 6, at 2135.
45. H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. (2011) (repealing House rule); H.R. Con. Res. 27, 114th Cong. (2015)
(repealing Senate rule); see also Kysar, supra note 6, at 2135; David Reich & Richard Kogan, Introduction
to Budget “Reconciliation,” Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/1-22-15bud.pdf
[https://perma.cc/87FL-ZYFQ].
46. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029
(2010). Other parts of the healthcare reform plan are enacted under the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
47. See, e.g., American Health Care Act of 2017, H.R. 1628, 115th Cong. (2017). See also S. Con.
Res. 3, 115th Cong. (2017) (providing for reconciliation instructions in budget resolution).
48. Josh Chafetz, The Filibuster Was Already Doomed Before the Nuclear Option Vote, WASH. POST
(Apr. 6, 2007), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/04/06/the-filibuster-wasalready-doomed-before-the-nuclear-option-vote/?utm_term=.5207d9ffab50
[https://perma.cc/6F3EYKMD]. For instance, when House Democrats declined to vote, causing the body to fail its quorum rules,
the Speaker of the House simply recorded the names of Democrats for the purpose of fulfilling the
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majority could prefer adhering to the limitations imposed by the budget process
because they fear minority retaliation, this fear no longer seems to hem in
lawmakers as it once did.
Reconciliation serves as a release valve against the pressures of obstruction
by the minority party, helping to stave off the elimination of the legislative
filibuster. Tax policy is one of the most contentious and wide-sweeping areas of
government, and the majority’s will to effectuate its agenda in this area is acute.
The Byrd Rule requires that reconciliation provisions be budget-related, which
most of tax law is. Because reconciliation can move policy forward in this area,
the need to get rid of the legislative filibuster entirely becomes less necessary.
Because reconciliation has become a tool to bypass the minority, it should be
no surprise that its boundaries in that context have expanded and will continue
to do so. From a strategic perspective, it also makes sense for the majority to
eliminate the legislative filibuster in incremental steps, which reconciliation
allows it to do. Exercising the nuclear option may backfire on the majority party
once the minority regains control of the Senate. Eroding the filibuster gradually
allows the majority party to at least obtain a big victory each time the filibuster
gets weakened and limits the risk of backfiring to the particular subject matter at
hand.
This incremental approach to the nuclear option has borne out thus far. The
expansion of reconciliation to encompass tax cuts and health care reform can be
seen as an initial step in that process,49 even though a supermajority of Senators
recently expressed support for retention of the legislative filibuster.50 The
majority’s elimination of the filibuster with respect to lower court confirmations
and then Supreme Court nominees continued the trend.
b. Reconciliation and the 2017 tax legislation. The history of reconciliation
illustrates that its scope is increasing, and the expansion process will likely
continue. Trying to accommodate ambitious tax legislation within the confines of
reconciliation, however, has impacted the budget process (as well as tax policy).
quorum. In the Senate, the filibuster has faced waves of reforms. In 1917, the Senate adopted the cloture
rule, which allows a supermajority vote to end debate, after a controversial invocation of the filibuster.
In 1975, the cloture requirement dropped from a two-thirds vote to three-fifths following a period of an
increase in filibustering. More recently, the Senate has eliminated the filibuster completely for
nominations. Id.
49. Appropriation bills are another likely area to face elimination of the filibuster since, like
reconciliation bills, they have a special procedural status. This feature might help contain the nuclear
option to that context. Repealing the filibuster for appropriations bills would also have lower stakes
because of such bills’ temporary nature and limited subject matter. Appropriations typically fund the
government for a year, although sometimes less. Appropriations also are not allowed to change existing
law or contain provisions that are not germane to the subject matter of the bill. David Freddoso, Nuclear
Option for Appropriations Bills: It’s Probably Only a Matter of Time, WASH. EXAMINER (Jan. 23, 2018),
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/nuclear-option-for-appropriations-bills-its-probably-only-amatter-of-time/article/2621113 [https://perma.cc/S3YU-AFCX].
50. Ted Barrett, 61 Senators Sign Letter to Preserve Filibuster Rules, CNN (Apr. 9, 2017),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/07/politics/senate-filibuster-rules-letter/index.html [https://perma.cc/U7X8QD5A].
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The sunsets of prior reconciliation tax cuts are one such maneuver, and that tactic
continues with the new TCJA sunsets. During the 2017 process, the majority
party also explored other methods to meet reconciliation’s procedural
requirements.
In early 2017, Republicans announced their plan to pass complex tax reform
through reconciliation, which was itself unprecedented. In the past, tax reform
has been conducted in a bipartisan fashion. Bipartisanship is often thought of as
a necessary ingredient to tax reform so that one party alone does not get blamed
for taking away special tax benefits or otherwise raising taxes on one industry or
another.51
As mentioned above, the Byrd Rule requires that reconciliation bills not
decrease revenues beyond the budget window period. Under reconciliation, a
permanent tax cut has to be paid for with spending cuts or tax increases. Sunsets
were used to pass the reconciliation tax cuts of the 2000s so that the law would
expire prior to the end of the budget window. These temporary reconciliation
bills, however, primarily involved simple rate cuts for individuals. In 2017,
Republicans were worried that making complex tax reform temporary would
cause much greater planning distortions, especially on the business side, muting
the growth effects of the plan. One study estimated that a temporary corporate
rate cut would largely be a windfall to shareholders with little impact on economic
growth.52 In order to combat the problems that sunsets would present for complex
tax reform, lawmakers proposed to simply lengthen the budget window from a
ten-year period to twenty, even thirty, years.53 This way the tax reform bill could
have a much further off sunset date, potentially overcoming the downsides of
temporary policies.
Lawmakers also contemplated other ways to avoid Byrd Rule objections. The
House’s “A Better Way” blueprint for tax reform prescribed using a baseline of
current policy rather than the traditional current law baseline to reduce the costs
of the plan.54 The official cost of legislation is the difference between the baseline
and the amount of government revenues that are generated or spent subsequent
to the enactment of the legislation.55 Under budget rules, the baseline generally
follows “current law,” or the law as written.56 A current policy baseline, on the
51. See Kysar, supra note 6, at 2145–46.
52. Alan Cole, Why Temporary Corporate Income Tax Cuts Won’t Generate Much Growth, TAX
FOUND.
(2017),
https://files.taxfoundation.org/20170612135617/Tax-Foundation-FF549.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K9M5-6PUY].
53. Sahil Kapur, GOP Push for 20-Year Tax Cut Grows as Ryan Seeks Permanent Fix, BLOOMBERG
(June 24, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-24/gop-push-for-20-year-tax-cutgrows-as-ryan-seeks-permanent-fix [https://perma.cc/E7ZA-STBR].
54. BETTER.GOP, A BETTER WAY: OUR VISION FOR A CONFIDENT AMERICA 16 (June 24, 2016),
https://abetterway.speaker.gov/_assets/pdf/ABetterWay-Tax-PolicyPaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9N96AM9].
55. For discussions of budget baselines, see generally Kamin, supra note 40; David Kamin &
Rebecca Kysar, Temporary Tax Laws & the Budget Baseline 125 (N.Y.U. Working paper No. 17-44,
2017).
56. CBO, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2011 TO 2021 (2011)
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other hand, measures the costs of policy changes not against the baseline of
current law but against a baseline assuming the continuation of current policy.
With a current policy baseline, expiring laws are typically presumed to be
permanent, thereby making their extension costless.57
In addition to these tactics, there was also growing pressure to rely upon
nontraditional estimates external to the independent estimators, and to dispense
with regular process involving the Joint Committee on Taxation (“JCT”) and the
CBO. These developments occurred in the context of TCJA, as well as with the
attempted repeal of the ACA earlier in the year.58
Ultimately, lawmakers sunsetted most of the provisions aimed at individuals
in 2025 in order to fit the bill through reconciliation. The sunsets allowed the bill
to be compliant with the Byrd Rule and to meet the $1.5 trillion limit for deficit
increases.59 Republicans retained the ten-year window and the current policy
baseline, although the latter ended up shaping the magnitude of the tax cut fairly
dramatically. Congress also ultimately deferred to the JCT.
These budget controversies will likely have continuing effects. For instance,
the current policy baseline debate tees up the costless extension of the expiring
provisions of TCJA down the line, as is discussed below, and Congress may be
one step closer to relying upon unofficial revenue estimates. The next Part
evaluates these developments and discusses how budget process pressures
ultimately shaped the tax bill.
III
THE TAX BILL AND THE 2017 BUDGET PROCESS
The pressures to enact the tax bill would impact the budget process in myriad
ways. But before we begin that discussion, it is helpful to point out that, as a
constitutional matter, budget rules, even when codified, do not bind Congress
because they are considered rules of procedure. Courts generally cannot enforce
them against Congress since this would undermine Congress’s lawmaking
authority and separation of powers principles. Additionally, a simple majority in
each house can change or waive them.60 Congress can thus easily ignore or evade
the rules upon their application. In a climate of increasing hostility between the

(describing debt projections as reflecting current law).
57. Kamin & Kysar, supra note 55, at 127.
58. Jim Tankersley, Republicans Sought to Undercut an Unfavorable Analysis of the Tax Plan, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/04/us/politics/republicans-joint-committee-ontaxation-estimate.html [https://perma.cc/5FD8-GNA8]; Alan Rappeport, C.B.O. Head, Who Prizes
Nonpartisanship, Finds Work Under G.O.P. Attack, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/19/us/politics/cbo-congressional-budget-office.html
[https://perma.cc/3NE2-WTDX].
59. Because of the latter, most of the individual provisions sunset in 2025 rather than the end of the
budget window in 2027.
60. Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 76 CAL. L.
REV. 595, 667 (1988) (analyzing how either House of Congress, acting alone, could undo the statutory
budget process rules of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act).
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parties, the rules become more and more unstable.
As to the purpose of budget rules, it my view that the general aim of budget
rules should be to protect the interests of future generations rather than to simply
provide information for decision-making purposes.61 Such protection is necessary
given the tendency of the political process to reward the shifting of financial
obligations to later generations.62 The budget rules also serve to overcome a
collective action problem. Lawmakers may have a primary goal of deficit
reduction, but they will individually defect from that goal if others do so. The
rules, by serving the goal of deficit reduction, can help lawmakers overcome these
coordination issues.
A. Longer Budget Windows
As described above, numerous policymakers advocated for a longer budget
window in order to accommodate deficit-increasing tax reform, but ultimately,
lawmakers retained the ten-year budget window. An extended budget window
would have posed difficulties for the budget process. Although there are some
valid reasons for choosing a longer budget window, these tend to be obscured if
the window is extended for the purpose of avoiding a shorter sunset date under
reconciliation.
1. Pros and Cons of Longer Budget Windows
The Budget Act of 1974 provides that windows must be a minimum of five
years, but beyond that lawmakers have flexibility in setting their length in the
budget resolution. Historically, budget windows were typically five years, but
since the mid-1990s, the CBO has used a ten-year budget window period.63 This
shift occurred in part due to interest in analyzing the long-term impact of the 1997
Balanced Budget Amendment.64 OMB’s budget windows have oscillated
between five and ten years. A budget window longer than ten years would have
been unprecedented.
At first glance, a longer budget window seems to further the goals of deficit
reduction. Cutting off the window at ten years allows policymakers to simply
ignore costs after that time period. For this reason, some have suggested that the
budget window be much longer, perhaps estimating costs of legislation over a
seventy-five-year period, which would follow the timeframe for estimating the
61. See Alan J. Auerbach, Budget Windows, Sunsets, and Fiscal Control, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 87, 88–89
(2006).
62. Buchanan and Wagner examined the lawmaking process’s bias towards deficits in an influential
book that, in part, led to Keynesian economics falling out of favor among economists. JAMES M.
BUCHANAN & RICHARD E. WAGNER, DEMOCRACY IN DEFICIT: THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF LORD
KEYNES (1977). This view is not uncontroversial. For instance, in the Great Depression and Great
Recession eras, lawmakers were critiqued for being too reluctant to borrow and invest. In recent decades,
however, the overarching tendency has been to deficit spend.
63. R.G. Penner, Dealing with Uncertain Budget Forecasts, 22 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 1, 12 (2002).
64. Robert McClelland, Why We Should Stick with a 10-Year Budget Window, TAX POL’Y CTR.
(Aug. 9, 2017), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/why-we-should-stick-10-year-budget-window
[https://perma.cc/VUV6-EQ4L].
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fiscal outlook for Medicare and Social Security.
Depending on the details of tax reform, a longer budget window could better
capture its fiscal impact. For instance, changing from the current tax depreciation
system, in which investment expenditures are recovered over time, to one of
expensing, in which such cost is expensed immediately, would have significant
upfront costs that diminish over time.65 Similarly, repealing or limiting interest
deductibility would raise little revenue upfront but substantially more over time.
By some estimates, a move to full expensing and elimination of the interest
deduction would lose $1 trillion over the first decade but would raise $1 trillion
over the second.66
The case for a longer budget window grows stronger in light of recent events.
In the past, one obstacle to a longer budget window has been the need to produce
estimates of the macro-economic effects of legislative proposals under so-called
“dynamic scoring.”67 In recent years, Congress has started to direct the estimators
to dynamically score proposed legislation, a process that is quickly becoming
routine for major legislation.68 The estimators’ ability to conduct such estimates
breaks down one obstacle to a longer budget window.
Lengthening the budget window, however, might simply prove too
unworkable, heavily testing the processing power of the CBO and the JCT, which
are accustomed to working on a ten-year timeframe. Forecasting variables—such
as discount rates, economic growth, and macroeconomic factors—across a much
longer horizon will introduce substantial uncertainty into the scoring process.
Additionally, the longer the budget window, the greater the sensitivity of the
forecasts to subtle changes in these assumptions.69 The CBO has estimated the
90% confidence range surrounding its forecast of the deficit to be plus or minus
5% of GDP after five years. After twenty years, however, this margin of error
rises to 17% of GDP.70 At such levels of uncertainty, projections become
relatively meaningless. CBO could mitigate some of the volatility in its longrange projections by updating the growth rate in its models more slowly or giving

65. Kyle Pomerleau & Scott Greenberg, Full Expensing Costs Less Than You’d Think, TAX FOUND.
(June 13, 2017), https://taxfoundation.org/full-expensing-costs-less-than-youd-think/ [https://perma.cc/
R3C3-ADAJ]. The tax bill adopted such a provision for expensing in some circumstances, but the
provision lasts only five years. The tax bill also limited interest deductibility.
66. Kyle Pomerleau, How a Longer Budget Window Helps and Doesn’t, TAX FOUND. (June 27,
2017), https://taxfoundation.org/longer-budget-window-helps-doesnt/ [https://perma.cc/57YU-74ME].
67. George K. Yin, Temporary-Effect Legislation, Political Accountability, and Fiscal Restraint, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 210 (2009).
68. H.R. Res. 5, 108th Cong. § 2(j) (2003) (adopting a dynamic scoring rule). JCT, for instance,
produced a macroeconomic analysis of TCJA. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-69-17, 115TH CONG.,
MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 1, THE “TAX CUTS AND
JOBS ACT” (Comm. Print 2017).
69. Yin, supra note 67, at 209.
70. CBO, THE UNCERTAINTY OF BUDGET PROJECTIONS: A DISCUSSION OF DATA AND
METHODS (Mar. 2007), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/78xx/doc7837/03-05uncertain.pdf#page=18 [https://perma.cc/M7WV-C75S].
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new data less weight, but such forecasts would sacrifice accuracy for stability.71
Although the estimators have some experience estimating costs beyond the
budget window in order to ensure a bill’s compliance with the Byrd Rule, its
longer-term projections for these purposes remain limited.72 A longer budget
window places the estimators “in the untenable position of having to defend the
indefensible,” which inevitably “increase[s] the suspicion, if not the reality, of
political manipulation.”73
For instance, in scoring a Senate Obamacare repeal bill, Democrats asked
CBO to extend their analysis out twenty years for Medicaid outlays.74 Although
CBO complied with the request, estimating that the bill would create a 35%
reduction in Medicaid spending over two decades, it could not quantify the
legislation’s effect on insurance coverage beyond the coming decade since it
lacked an insurance coverage baseline during that time period. CBO stated that
long-term federal spending on Medicaid becomes “increasingly difficult” in the
years beyond the budget window due to variables in people’s health, in states’
decisions about Medicaid policy, and in medical care that are “almost impossible
to predict.”75 CBO instead used a formulaic approach for years beyond 2026 that
combined estimates of Medicaid enrollees with mechanical projections of growth
in federal spending, adjusting for demographic changes in the Medicaid
population. In so doing, CBO warned that it was only able to employ this
simplified method when legislation “affect[s] spending in a similarly
straightforward manner.”76
An extended budget window would also present substantial gaming
opportunities that could negatively impact the budget process. Lawmakers could
pretend to pay for costly policies by specifying tax increases or spending cuts that
would not go into effect for many years—an event that would be unlikely to
actually occur. For instance, a 1997 advisory council to address the insolvency of
the Social Security system suggested that the gap be closed by initiating a 1.6%
increase in the payroll tax, but only starting in the year 2045.77 The long budget
window of seventy-five years, which is used in the entitlement context, allowed
this far-off tax to fully count as an offset even though it was unlikely to ever be
enacted.

71. McClelland, supra note 64.
72. For an argument that the budget window should be reduced to five years, see Penner, supra note
63.
73. Yin, supra note 67, at 211.
74. CBO, LONGER-TERM EFFECTS OF THE BETTER CARE RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2017 ON
MEDICAID SPENDING (June 2017), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/reports/
52859-medicaid.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LGV-2C89].
75. Id. at 1.
76. Id.
77. See Alan J. Auerbach, Budget Windows, Sunsets, and Fiscal Control, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 87, 88
(2006); see also Peter A. Diamond & Peter R. Orszag, Accrual Accounting for Social Security, 41 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 173, 185 (2004); Howell E. Jackson, Accounting for Social Security and Its Reform, 41 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 59, 85–86 (2004) (critiquing the delayed tax proposal as “irresponsible”).
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This problem already exists to some extent under a shorter budget window.
Congress has repeatedly delayed the effective date of the Cadillac Tax, which
imposes an excise tax on high-cost employer-sponsored health insurance plan.
The tax was originally enacted in 2010 as part of the ACA and was set to go into
effect in 2018, although a recent budget deal has delayed the tax until 2022.78
TCJA also deploys far off tax increases on multinational corporations beginning
in the year 2026.79 It is unclear if Congress will ever allow these increases to go
into effect.
The advantage of delaying unpopular taxes is that they produce revenue to
meet budget rules but also signal to constituents that lawmakers do not intend to
let the tax actually take effect. A longer budget window creates incentives to
enact disingenuous provisions that offset revenue losses that will never come to
fruition. A longer delay will minimize the risk that the law will go into effect,
allowing many chances for eventual repeal. In this manner, lengthy budget
windows accommodate gimmicks that push costs onto future generations.
On the other hand, short budget windows also allow for a different kind of
gamesmanship. This phenomenon is perhaps best illustrated by the tax provisions
involving Roth IRAs. Traditional and Roth IRAs are similar savings vehicles but
differ in tax treatment. Contributions to traditional IRAs are deductible with the
consequence that withdrawals are taxable. Contributions to Roth IRAs are not
deductible but withdrawals are tax-exempt. If interest and tax rates are held
constant, these vehicles produce identical revenue costs from a present value
perspective. Traditional IRAs have large revenue costs upfront, in the year of
contribution, whereas revenue losses from Roth IRAs come in the year of
withdrawal.80
Historically, lawmakers have exploited this difference in order to generate
revenues within the budget window period. For instance, in 2006, Congress
passed a law that removed the income limit on converting traditional IRAs to
Roth IRAs. The conversion triggered a taxable event, thereby raising $6.4 billion
in revenues during the budget window period. In present value terms, the change
in law cost the government $25 billion in revenues over the long haul, but these
costs were predominantly ignored because they fell outside the budget window
period.81 Republicans proposed similar “Rothification” revenue games in the
78. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, § 10901 (2010);
Extension of Continuing Appropriations Act of 2018, H.R. 195, 115th Congress (2018).
79. Beginning in 2026, the deduction for foreign derived intangible income is reduced from 37.5%
to 21.875%. The deduction for global intangible low-taxed income is reduced from 50% to 37.5%. An
earlier proposal made these increases revenue-contingent, meaning that they were turned off if revenues
turned out to be higher than expected. Notably, the delayed tax increases were originally designed such
that the tax increases could be turned off “even if revenues through 2026 are hundreds of billions below
what would be expected if the tax cuts weren’t enacted in the first place.” David Kamin, The Senate’s
Revenue-Trigger Giveaway to Businesses, MEDIUM (Nov. 22, 2017), https://medium.com/whateversource-derived/the-senates-revenue-trigger-giveaway-to-businesses-97b73a624ec1
[https://perma.cc/VBW5-5DNV]. This revenue-trigger did not make it into the final bill.
80. See Auerbach, supra note 77, at 88.
81. Richard Rubin, Tax Break for Roth IRA Conversion Lured 10% of Millionaires, BLOOMBERG
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2017 process.82 Although these revenue-raisers did not make it into the
legislation, Congress has kept them on the table.83
2. Budget Windows Going Forward
Lawmakers ultimately decided to keep the budget window length as it is, but
does this mean they will do so going forward? Perhaps not. One of the reasons
that Republicans retained the ten-year budget window for 2017 was that a longer
budget window might have still forced a relatively short sunset. This is because a
temporary corporate rate cut would have affected revenues for many years after
the expiration date. Earlier in the year, the JCT estimated that a three-year,
corporate rate cut to 20% would have produced “nonnegligible” revenue losses
beyond the ten-year budget window period, seven years after the sunset date.84
This is because companies would time their taxable profits to occur in years when
the lower corporate rate is in effect, thereby lowering profits, and thus revenue,
in later years when the rate reverts to its pre-sunset level.85 To be in compliance
with the Byrd Rule, a corporate rate cut would have to have sunsetted well within
ten years even if the budget window was extended to twenty years.
In the end, lawmakers chose to sunset the individual provisions rather than
the corporate rate cut. The budget resolution, however, required lawmakers to
set forth the length of the budget window relatively early in the process, before
the decision on sunsets had been made.86 The fact that a long budget window
would have still required a short sunset for the corporate rate may have
influenced their decision to continue with the traditional ten year budget window.
Going forward, a different set of policies under consideration may push
lawmakers to lengthen the budget window in order to meet the constraints of
reconciliation. How then, should we evaluate such a move?
Alan Auerbach has described the debate over budget windows as involving
the following tradeoffs: Budget windows that are too short allow for costs to be
shifted beyond the budget window period, but budget windows that are too long
(Jan. 3, 2014), http://www.mercurynews.com/2014/01/03/tax-break-for-roth-ira-conversion-lured-10-ofmillionaires/ [https://perma.cc/56GZ-CNHT].
82. Amir El-Sibaei, What Rothification Means for Tax Reform, TAX FOUND. (Sept. 12, 2017),
https://taxfoundation.org/what-rothification-means-for-tax-reform/ [https://perma.cc/67Q7-BFVX].
83. Stephanie Cumings, Republicans Expected to Return to Retirement Policy for Revenue, 158 TAX
NOTES 439, 439 (2018).
84. Letter from Thomas A. Barthold, Chief of Staff of Joint Committee on Taxation, to Paul D.
Ryan, Speaker of the House of Representatives (Apr. 25, 2017), (on file at http://www.politico.com/f/
?id=0000015b-a645-d0b0-afdb-b7c7e71d0001 [https://perma.cc/LDV8-PN2U]).
85. The JCT analysis on the issue referenced timing shifts of foreign tax credits as one reason why
a temporary corporate rate cut would lose revenue in the out-years. Although this dynamic would likely
not be an issue in the new quasi-territorial system enacted in TCJA, the ability of businesses to carry
forward other credits, such as the research credit and the low-income housing credit, would likely result
in revenue losses in the years beyond the budget window.
86. In fact, just before release of the initial version of the House bill several weeks following the
budget resolution, lawmakers were reportedly considering sunsetting the corporate rate cut. Damian
Paletta (@damianpaletta), TWITTER (Nov. 1, 2017, 2:51 PM), https://twitter.com/damianpaletta/
status/925842836804833281 [https://perma.cc/HVS9-VLER].
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include future years for which announced policies cannot be taken seriously, also
allowing for gamesmanship.87 Moreover, even if such policies are eventually
enacted in the distant future, they will impose costs predominantly on future
generations, an undesirable result given the aim of the budget rules to protect
that constituency.88
Auerbach argues that these deficiencies could be overcome by shifting away
from windows that give equal weights to policies within the budget window
period and then fall to zero.89 Auerbach also rejects an infinite budget window
that gives full weight to policies in later time periods.90 Instead, budget rules,
according to Auerbach, should place less weight on policies in future years,
discounting expected cash flows (over and above normal discounting for interest)
in order to reflect the reality that future policies are unlikely to be enacted.91
Auerbach’s approach, while theoretically sound, would be difficult, if not
impossible to implement in practice. Judging the staying power of a particular
policy, or group of policies, would require ascertaining the probability that
political stalemate or change in control will occur and how sensitive the policy is
to those factors. One could imagine, however, some kind of discounting of future
years that would not necessarily follow Auerbach’s precision but would avoid the
cliff-effect of the current ten-year budget window.
Daniel Shaviro has also attempted to deal with gamesmanship over a longer
budgetary window, colorfully describing a proposed massive tax increase upon
newborns that is collected when they reach the ripe old age of seventy as one such
maneuver.92 Shaviro proposes disregarding, for official estimates, policies if they
are “discontinuous changes” that are adverse in nature, such as policies that
increase detriments to constituencies rather than benefits.93 Under this proposal,
the budget rules would ignore a tax increase that suddenly springs into life at a
later period of time.
Shaviro’s proposal, like many budget rules that attempt to deal categorically
with policies that vary across time, is somewhat over-inclusive. For instance, there
may be legitimate policy reasons for preferring that a tax increase begin several
years into the future, such as giving markets time to adjust to a new regime.
Moreover, the definition of discontinuity itself might prove easily circumvented
through the use of provisions that phase in gradually. Given these difficulties, it
may be preferable to simply shorten the budget window period.
As a normative matter, there are no easy answers to setting the correct length
of the budget window. Indeed, it might very well be that heterogeneity in budget
windows is preferred, with their length extending to accommodate those policies
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Auerbach, supra note 77, at 88.
Id.
Id. at 94–98.
Id. at 89 n.2.
Id. at 99–100.
DANIEL SHAVIRO, DO DEFICITS MATTER? 234 (1997).
Id.

KYSAR_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 2 2018]

TAX LAW AND THE ERODING BUDGET PROCESS

5/18/2018 4:22 PM

77

with greater permanence, like Social Security, and shortening for unstable
policies, like discretionary spending.94 Lack of forecasting ability might also
weigh in favor of such heterogeneity. For instance, Medicare costs that rely on
uncertain predictions of how technology will advance might call for shorter
windows, in contrast to Social Security projections that do not face as dire
complications in long-term estimating.95
Although theoretical arguments can be made for extending the budget
window, at least in certain contexts, these are not convincing where the pressures
of reconciliation are driving the change towards longer budget windows, rather
than any thoughtful inventory of current budget policy. A budget window formed
under these circumstances will almost certainly be of sub-optimal length from the
standpoint of accurately assessing the nation’s future commitments since its
extension was not designed for this purpose.
It could be argued that the longer budget window would produce the ancillary
benefit of more accurately portraying government commitments because, by
happenstance, it coincides with, or is at least closer in length, to the optimal
budget window for that purpose. But it is difficult to see how a twenty- or thirtyyear window, as was proposed to accommodate the 2017 tax bill, would best
represent the budget trajectory or policy impact on the budget. Such a window
would still face the cliff effect, whereby all costs disappear beyond the window,
leading to estimating challenges for the latter decades.
Even assuming arguendo that a twenty- or thirty-year window more
accurately measures fiscal costs and receipts, a budget window lengthened to
circumvent budget rules will also be more likely to create further gamesmanship
than a budget window lengthened to more accurately capture the government’s
fiscal picture. That is, we can expect that the risks of a longer budget window—
using future offsets that are unlikely to occur—to be more or less pronounced
depending on the reason for the change in the window’s length. A Congress that
is willing and able to lengthen the window to avoid budget rules will also face
similar pressures to jeopardize deficit-decreasing goals through budget gimmicks
premised on that longer window.
In the end, it might be preferable to have different budget windows for
varying purposes. For purposes of the budget rules, a shorter budget window
would be advisable due to practical difficulties in implementing a longer window

94. See Auerbach, supra note 77, at 99. See also Henry J. Aaron, The Economics and Politics of
Long-Term Budget Projections n.7 (Hutchins Ctr. on Fiscal & Monetary Pol’y Brookings, Working Paper
No. 8, 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/15_economics_politics_longrun_
budget_aaron.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3KR-DZT4]. (“The short term nature of almost all budget
commitments regarding discretionary spending and much so-called mandatory spending contrasts starkly
with the commitments under Social Security, where tax and spending are heavily freighted with political
(although not legal or contractual) commitment. Few federal budget categories carry any such message
of permanence. Tax laws are changed periodically in major ways. Defense and other discretionary
spending has fluctuated over enormous ranges. The difference is one of degree, not of kind, but the
difference is palpable and large.”).
95. Aaron, supra note 94, at 1.
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and the gaming opportunities presented by such a window. Outside of the official
scores, however, the estimators could also make longer-term projections when
feasible. Estimators could deal with the greater uncertainty produced by these
unofficial, longer-term projections by incorporating confidence intervals or a
range of results. This option is not possible for the official estimates because the
budget rules require point estimates and thus this is further justification for
keeping the official window shorter.96
It should also be noted that the current system, in a sense, employs multiple
budget windows for purposes of reconciliation. The official budget window is ten
years, but the Byrd Rule effectively requires consideration of a longer window
requiring deficit neutrality in the period beyond the official budget window. The
operation of this “shadow” budget window in the background of the official one
could be seen as creating a compromise between those different types of
gamesmanship identified by Auerbach.
One other related point—although the Byrd Rule essentially requires
estimates for the out-years, there is no transparency regarding how such
estimates are made or even what they are. The law allows the budget committee
chair to use discretion to make these determinations.97 A longer budget window
would have an indirect effect of bringing to light such estimates. One could thus
argue that the difference between short and long budget windows is the degree
of transparency.98 Instead of making the window longer, one could require
greater transparency of the out-year determinations. This would, however, bring
the inaccuracy disadvantages that accompany longer budget windows. A
compromise approach would be for the chair to at least give a general sense of
the out-year scores and the process involved in comprising them.
Finally, the type of gamesmanship that results from shorter budget
windows—namely sunsets—can also be addressed through reformation of the
budget baseline, a topic discussed below. Addressing the problem of temporary
legislation through the budget baseline does not present the same type of difficult
estimating questions that addressing the problem through lengthening of the
budget window raises.
3. Shifting Baselines
a. A Brief History of the Budget Baseline. During the 2017 tax legislative
process, there were many signals that pivotal Republican lawmakers were
considering changing the official baseline to one of “current policy” in order to
fit bigger tax cuts within the parameters of reconciliation.99 This shift would have
96. Yin, supra note 67, at 210. See also Doug Elmendorf, Communicating the Uncertainty of CBO’s
Estimates, CBO (Dec. 15, 2014) https://www.cbo.gov/publication/49860 [https://perma.cc/MR26-LZ4S]
(incorporating some of these arguments).
97. 2 U.S.C. §§ 643(a), 641(d)(4) (2012).
98. Thanks to George Yin for this point.
99. See, e.g., Sahil Kapur, GOP Eyes Budget Maneuver to Allow $450 Billion More in Tax Cuts,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-22/gop-eyes-budget-
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been a significant change to the budget process. However, even without a formal
change to the rules, the current policy concept has significantly impacted the
budget process and the tax bill.
The current official baseline is described as a “current law” baseline. This is
because the baseline, the parameters of which were first set out in the Budget
Enforcement Act of 1990,100 generally follows current law as written with some
exceptions. For instance, in most cases, if a law sunsets, the baseline takes the
sunset seriously, assuming that the law will expire as scheduled. In other specific
contexts, the baseline deviates from this rule, instead assuming that annual
appropriations, certain temporary spending programs like Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families and farm subsidies, and temporary taxes that are earmarked
to trust funds continue without regard to their legal temporality.101 The baseline
also assumes that the government will issue debt above the debt limit, contrary
to enacted law.
The parameters of a current policy baseline are less defined. The blueprint
plan for tax reform, released by the House Tax Reform Task Force in 2016, called
for the assumption that current policy will extend since this is in keeping with
“historical experience.”102 The question, of course, is what constitutes current
policy. From the blueprint, it is clear that the intention was to assume the
continuation of several expiring tax provisions,103 chiefly the partial expensing of
new business equipment and property and a group of about fifty tax breaks
known as the tax extenders.104 A current policy baseline of the sort proposed in
the blueprint would have made extensions of these provisions, losing about $460
billion in revenues over a ten-year period, costless.
Although Congress has never directed CBO to use a current policy baseline
as the official one, there has been extensive governmental experience with the
concept. Controversy over baselines started after EGTRRA and JGTRRA
(collectively, the Bush tax cuts) were sunsetted. Efforts to make these cuts
permanent began almost immediately, but the costs of doing so were in the
trillions—nearly 2% of GDP.105 Many experts thought the official baseline put
forth by CBO reflected rosy assumptions that had no bearing on reality.
maneuver-to-allow-450-billion-more-in-tax-cuts [https://perma.cc/D6F4-YRHS].
100. Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 257, 104 Stat. 1388–591 (1990). The
BEA refined the baseline previously established in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control
Act of 1985 (BBEDCA). Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99177, § 251(a)(6), 99 Stat. 1037, 1067-68 (1985). The BBEDCA baseline had been used in administering a
possible sequester if deficit targets weren’t met; the BEA then adopted a revised version of this baseline
for scoring of new legislation.
101. Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 § 257.
102. BETTER.GOP, supra note 54, at 16.
103. See id.
104. Many of these temporary provisions incentivize alternative energy. STAFF OF J. COMM. TAX’N,
JCX-1-17, 115TH CONG., LIST OF EXPIRING FEDERAL TAX PROVISIONS: 2016–2026 (Comm. Print 2016).
105. Emily Horton, The Legacy of the 2001 and 2003 Bush Tax Cuts, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/the-legacy-of-the-2001-and-2003bush-tax-cuts [https://perma.cc/A4X9-VNFL].
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Assuming the tax cuts were truly temporary was an unlikely scenario, and thus
the baseline drastically overestimated future revenues. Because the Bush tax cuts
were so large, the stakes over the baseline dispute were high.
In an effort to depict the nation’s fiscal picture more accurately, think tanks
began putting forth more realistic baselines that assumed the continuation of the
Bush tax cuts.106 These alternative baselines became influential, in some respects
more so than the official baseline. By Fiscal Year 2005, Presidential Budgets
under President Bush and the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”)
baseline no longer assumed current law but instead reflected current policy by
ignoring the sunsets.107
Although arguably more accurate, the current policy deadline made the costs
of making the cuts permanent disappear. A mere temporary extension of the cuts
would even score as a revenue gain under this approach. President Obama’s
budgets also shifted the OMB baseline to current policy, incorporating some of
the Bush tax cuts into the baseline.108 In these baselines, the Obama
administration even included those tax cuts it did not support into the baseline, a
move out of the Bush Administration’s playbook.109 Thus, when the
administration proposed to let lapse the cuts for high-income taxpayers as
scheduled in current law, it scored this policy position as increasing revenues.110
CBO also began experimenting in how it constructed baselines; it constructed
an “alternative fiscal scenario,” which assumed continuation of the cuts.111
Although the official CBO baseline remained one of current law, Congress did
shift certain procedural rules to mirror the consequences of a current policy
baseline. For instance, the budget resolution for Fiscal Year 2010 granted
authority to the Chairman of the House Budget Committee to ignore the
budgetary effects of certain policies, including the extension of most of the Bush

106. Kamin, supra note 40, at 156.
107. See OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL
PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 222 (2008);
OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MAJOR SAVINGS AND REFORMS IN
THE PRESIDENT’S 2008 BUDGET 203 (2007); Cheryl Block, Budget Gimmicks, in FISCAL CHALLENGES:
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO BUDGET POLICY 58 (Elizabeth Garrett et al. eds.) (2007). See
also Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1028 (2011).
108. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL
YEAR 2010 REVENUE PROPOSALS (2009) (“Most of the tax reductions enacted in 2001 and 2003 expire
on December 31, 2010. The Administration’s baseline projection of current policy continues all of these
expiring provisions except for repeal of estate and generation-skipping transfer taxes.”); OFF.OF MGMT.
& BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 170 n.5 (2010) [hereinafter OMB, ANALYTICAL
PERSPECTIVES 2011] (“[T]he Budget, in the current policy baseline, assumes continuation of the 2001
and 2003 tax cuts as amended through June 2009 . . . . Among other changes, this continues two
amendments made to these tax cuts . . . [which] expand child tax credit refundability and the earned
income tax credit for married couples.”).
109. Kysar, supra note 107, at 1029–30.
110. See OMB, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 2011, supra note 90, at 187–88 tbl.14-3 (forecasting
that failing to extend the 20% rate for upper-income taxpayers will have a positive effect on revenues).
111. Kamin, supra note 40, at 157.
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tax cuts, for purposes of House business if they would have been ignored under
a current policy baseline.112 This allowed any extension of the cuts to avoid
needing revenue offsets under House rules, known as pay-as-you-go or PAYGO
rules, which require spending and revenue legislation that increase the deficit to
be paid for through tax increases or spending decreases.113 When the Bush tax
cuts were made permanent in 2013, Congress exempted these acts not only from
the House PAYGO rules but from their statutory form as well.114 When a portion
of the extenders were made permanent, Congress also carved out an exception
for them in the statutory pay-go rules.115
Despite much discussion of the current policy baseline in the 2017 legislative
process, Congress again ultimately adhered to maintaining the current law
baseline as the official baseline. This could have been because the Senate
parliamentarian took a stance that the new baseline could not be used for
purposes of reconciliation, or because any such baseline also had to apply to new
tax cuts that expire, as well as old ones. Rhetoric surrounding the current policy
baseline, however, shaped the policy parameters of the proposed reconciliation
bill. Key Republicans described the $1.5 trillion tax cut figure agreed upon in the
budget resolution as accommodating $500 billion of revenue from a current
policy baseline as well as $1 trillion from dynamic growth.116 Indeed, pivotal
Senators explicitly cited the current policy baseline as the reason for their positive
vote on the final bill.117 Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin also relied upon a
current policy baseline and growth effects in selling the tax package to the
public,118 and official analysis of TCJA from Treasury’s Office of Tax Policy
referenced the current policy baseline.119

112. S. Con. Res. 13, 111th Cong. § 421 (2009).
113. Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-139, 124 Stat. 8 (2010).
114. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 911, 126 Stat. 2313 (2012)
(ordering that the act’s budgetary effects be ignored for pay-go purposes).
115. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 1001, 129 Stat. 2242 (2016)
(preventing budgetary effects from entering on the paygo scorecard).
116. Ernst & Young, Senate FY 2018 Budget Clears Path for $1.5 Trillion Tax Cut, TAX NEWS
UPDATE: U.S. EDITION (Sept. 29, 2017), https://taxnews.ey.com/news/2017-1600-senate-fy-2018-budgetclears-path-for-15-trillion-tax-cut [https://perma.cc/4BFL-M2RH]; Dylan F. Moroses, Brady: State and
Local Deduction Deal Will be Part of Tax Bill, TAX ANALYSTS (Oct. 26, 2017),
http://www.taxanalysts.org/content/brady-state-and-local-deduction-deal-will-be-part-tax-bill
[https://perma.cc/MN9D-FCEJ].
117. Seth Hanlon & Alex Rowell, The Senate Tax Bill is Even More Costly Under Current Policy
Assumptions, AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/
2017/12/13/444103/senate-tax-bill-even-costly-current-policy-assumptions
[https://perma.cc/R3RADH4R] (referencing statements by Senators Flake and Corker that rely upon a current policy baseline in
justifying their support for tax bill, revenue losses notwithstanding).
118. “This Week” Transcript 10-1-17: Steven Mnuchin and Sen. Bernie Sanders, ABC NEWS (Oct. 1,
2017),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/week-transcript-10-17-steven-mnuchin-sen-bernie/story?id=
50200661 [https://perma.cc/QL8Z-9LA3].
119. DEP’T OF TREASURY, ANALYSIS OF GROWTH AND REVENUE ESTIMATES BASED ON THE U.S.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE TAX REFORM PLAN (Dec. 11, 2017) (concluding that the bill lost
approximately $1.5 trillion on a current law basis and approximately $1 trillion on a current policy basis).
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b. Gaming the Current Policy Baseline. As the above history illustrates, a
current policy baseline has the potential to allow the costs of making tax cuts
permanent to disappear. But it is the inconsistent use of the current policy
baseline, rather than the baseline per se, that causes the problem.120 Indeed, as
discussed below, a current policy baseline could be used to enhance the budget
process, but only when used consistently.
To understand how the baseline can be manipulated, it is first useful to
consider how either a current law or current policy baseline can properly account
for costs if used consistently.121 Assume, for instance, that in year one lawmakers
enact a tax cut that loses annual revenues of $100 billion and sunsets in the
following year, but the lawmakers have the intention of extending it. In year one,
under a current law baseline, the tax cut is assumed to expire in year two and is
thus scored as costing $100 billion. If, in year two, lawmakers indeed extend the
sunset for another year, the extension will then be scored as costing another $100
billion under the same baseline. At every extension, the budget process accounts
for the costs of the legislation that fall within the budget window and the costs of
the policy are correctly counted once. This is because the current law baseline is
used consistently at the time of original enactment and renewal.
The same point could be made about the consistent use of current policy
baselines. Under the same scenario, in year one, the tax cuts are assumed to be
permanent in keeping with the lawmakers’ policy going forward. Under this
scenario, the tax cut is scored as costing $1 trillion through the ten-year budget
window. In year two, the extension is costless because the current policy baseline
assumes the cut remains in place. This continues at every one-year extension.
Again, the costs of the provisions are fully accounted for, the difference being
that the costs are scored upfront under a current policy baseline.
Note that this discussion creates problems for one argument Republicans use
to justify a shift to a current policy baseline in the tax context. Republicans have
argued that this move merely aligns the tax side with the spending side, which
already assumes many expiring spending programs are permanent.122 Since the
current policy baseline in those cases is used consistently, however, they receive
no advantage as compared to temporary tax cuts.
Instead, if we switch from a current law baseline at the time of original
enactment to a current policy baseline at the time of extension, the costs of the
cuts will never be accounted for in the budget process. Under a current law
baseline in year one, the tax cut is assumed to expire as scheduled and thus is
scored as costing $100 billion. In year two, if lawmakers switch to a current policy
baseline that assumes the tax cut continues, the extension is scored as costless,

120. See Kamin, supra note 40, at 204.
121. This example comes from Kamin & Kysar, supra note 55, at 127–28.
122. Editorial Board, The GOP’s Tax Reform Baseline, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 31, 2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-gops-tax-reform-baseline-1504134278; Edwin J. Feulner, Giving Tax
Cuts a Fighting Chance, HERITAGE FOUND. (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.heritage.org/taxes/
commentary/giving-tax-cuts-fighting-chance [https://perma.cc/PDJ5-UCAD].
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causing the $100 billion cost of extending the cut to disappear. All subsequent
extensions would receive the same favorable treatment.
PAYGO exemptions for expiring tax policy can also serve the same effect, as
was made evident in the context of the Bush tax cuts when Congress waived their
application upon extension of the cuts in 2010 and in making them permanent in
2013. All of these moves, however, required sixty votes in the Senate. A baseline
shift is thus more effective than PAYGO exemptions if the legislation extending
the sunsetted provisions or making them permanent needs to be deficit-neutral
in order to be passed through reconciliation. Indeed, such a maneuver would
undermine the Byrd Rule’s protection of long-term fiscal restraint.123
The primary game is thus shifting between baselines across time by different
legislatures. Gamesmanship can also arise by inconsistently applying the concept
of current policy. Throughout 2017, Republicans contemplated making some of
the new tax cuts temporary in order to meet the requirements of the Byrd Rule.
Indeed, most of the individual provisions in the final bill were sunsetted at the
end of 2025 to comply with the Byrd Rule, as well as to lower costs within the
official 2018–2027 revenue window. Although Republicans called for the current
policy baseline to be used in the context of the expiring tax provisions already in
place, they failed to do so for any new temporary tax provisions.
In a sense, one could describe the Republican position as embodying a
mixture of current law and current policy baselines—the former for new expiring
law and the latter for old expiring law. Republicans could have justified this
distinction on the basis of the reasoning employed in the blueprint—only those
provisions where “historical experience” has shown Congressional intent to
extend get the current policy baseline.124 Note that this rationale opens the door
to switching to the current policy baseline for extension of the new cuts, because
at the time of extension there will be historical experience with that temporary
policy in place. In this manner, the costs of extension are likely to escape the
budget process.
In the end, lawmakers only informally incorporated the savings from the
current policy baseline into the $1.5 trillion limit for the tax cuts in the
reconciliation instructions. This essentially allowed Republicans to have their
cake and eat it too. They did not get to enjoy the benefit of the current policy
baseline for purposes of the Byrd Rule since the extra $500 billion was only rolled
into the overall figure for the tax cut applicable to the budget window period
(whereas a change in the official baseline would have also covered the period
beyond the budget window). They were, however, able to secure votes from
deficit hawks by invoking the current policy baseline to essentially make the tax
cut $500 billion larger while also not having the current policy baseline apply to
123. Kamin & Kysar, supra note 55, at 130.
124. These examples of gamesmanship all involve temporary legislation, but the gaming
opportunities extend beyond that context. The shift to the current policy baseline is easier to justify when
a timing mechanism like a sunset causes doubt as to whether current law captures the likely future course
of policy. However, the baseline could potentially be used to render costless any policy position.
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the new expiring tax cuts, which would have made the deficit-increasing package
non-compliant with the Byrd Rule and also would have exceeded the $1.5 trillion
limit.125 As mentioned above, Republicans could have differentiated between the
old expiring provisions and the new cuts, having the current policy baseline apply
to the former but not the latter, but it is unclear whether the Senate
Parliamentarian would have approved of this approach.126
Having scored the new temporary tax cuts as truly temporary under a current
law baseline, what will happen going forward? If history with the Bush tax cuts is
any guide, the rhetoric of the current policy baseline will obscure the costs of
renewal, which in turn will pave the way for permanency of the new expiring tax
cuts and an exemption from PAYGO rules.127 This dynamic will be even more
likely in the new environment given the now decades-long experience with the
current policy baseline and Republicans’ repeated reliance on it during the 2017
legislative process. A new tactic, however, might be to invoke the current policy
baseline to make permanent the expiring tax cuts in TCJA through
reconciliation. So long as such a bill does not have a mixture of old and new
expiring provisions, Republicans might have more luck getting the Senate
Parliamentarian on board with a current policy baseline.
c. Baseline Reforms. On the one hand, a current law baseline fails to paint
an accurate picture of future revenues by assuming an unrealistic course, for
example, that tax cuts expire as scheduled. A current policy baseline, on the other
hand, perhaps more accurately portrays future governmental obligations, but its
ill-defined and subjective boundaries enhance gamesmanship. Given the
likelihood that the expiring provisions in TCJA will further destabilize the budget
baseline, it is worthwhile to explore reform options to address these problems.
Indeed, in the discussion above, possible gamesmanship occurred because of
shifting between baselines across time and inconsistently applying the concept of
current policy to old and new expiring tax cuts. Both of these games could be
curtailed by formalizing the baseline to properly address temporary legislation in
some manner. Unfortunately, doing so is not that easy.
Temporary legislation produces a true quandary for the budget process.
Congress could have a rule whereby all temporary legislation is treated as
permanent. It would be simple to administer, requiring no judgment calls. But it
would also be over-inclusive since some temporary legislation is designed to be

125. Making the individual tax provisions permanent would cost approximately $240 billion over the
remainder of the budget window period since most of these expire in 2025 and the budget window runs
through 2027. See New Senate Tax Bill Hides over $500 Billion of Gimmicks, COMM. FOR A RESPONSIBLE
FED. BUDGET (Nov. 15, 2017), http://www.crfb.org/blogs/new-senate-tax-bill-hides-over-500-billiongimmicks [https://perma.cc/5B6T-T8QQ].
126. It is, in fact, possible that the Senate Parliamentarian advised Republicans against this
approach. Frustratingly, however, many of the Parliamentarian’s interpretations and actions are nontransparent. See Ellen P. Aprill & Daniel J. Hemel, The Tax Legislative Process: A Byrd’s Eye View, 81
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2018, at 134–35.
127. See Kysar, supra note 107, at 1026–35.
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truly temporary rather than just arising out of the avoidance of budget rules. For
instance, temporary legislation might be used in times of emergencies or to spur
investment during economic downturns. Sunsets enacted because of such events
should arguably be taken at face value. How then should we proceed?
There are proponents of shifting to a current policy baseline, or something
close to it. David Kamin argues that if the initial budget baseline was more
realistic to begin with, much budget gimmickry involving temporary legislation
would be shut down. Kamin suggests adoption of an “expectations baseline,”
which would adopt the best objective estimate of the future path of policy.128 In
the context of the Bush tax cuts, using an expectations baseline at the outset
would have meant that the cuts would have been scored as though they continued
rather than sunsetted since this reflected expectations at the time of enactment.
In Kamin’s view, this avoids the gaming that a current law baseline abets by
assuming temporary legislation expires.129 At the time of enactment, an
expectations baseline factors in the expected costs of legislation, thus preventing
lawmakers from hiding costs behind an unrealistic assumption that the legislation
will expire and also from benefitting from baseline shifts midstream.
Kamin attempts to protect against manipulation by assuring that the
expectations baseline would be assembled from objective, rather than anyone’s
subjective, views about what policy path represents the best estimate of what is
expected to occur. This determination could be outsourced, for instance to CBO
or think tanks.130 One could expect, however, that even if an independent body
constructs the expectations baseline, the estimating process will rely heavily upon
how lawmakers characterize the provision. The expectations baseline could easily
be undermined if lawmakers disingenuously disavow the intention to reenact or
make permanent the temporary provision at issue in order to game the baseline.
In the context of the official baseline, Kamin attempts to deal with this
gamesmanship by creating a default rule that new provisions are permanent if the
legislation in which they are enacted adds to the deficit. Congress could turn off
this default rule by explicitly stating that the provision is meant to be temporary.
Under Kamin’s proposal, this would be enforced by a point of order (requiring
sixty Senators to override it) such that any extension of a provision previously
designated to be temporary would be deemed out of order.131
A point of order, however, is not a foolproof way of protecting against
gamesmanship. Just as a supermajority of Senators eventually approved of
extending the Bush tax cuts while waiving PAYGO, we could expect the same
dynamic to occur with extensions of the expiring provisions, or at least the most
popular provisions. As a result of this ability to avoid the point of order, at the
outset, lawmakers will over-designate provisions as temporary in order to avoid
scoring them as permanent initially.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Kamin, supra note 40, at 181.
Id. at 182.
Id. at 181.
Id. at 207–08.
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The difficulty is that taking a more flexible approach to the baseline to
realistically reflect the varying expectations regarding the true length of sunsetted
laws opens the baseline up to subjectivity and hence gamesmanship. Still, Kamin
is right to question whether the official baseline could be improved upon. The
current law approach, especially with regard to temporary legislation, does not
reflect expected policy outcomes132 and thus fails to guide policy decisions or
private planning.133 It also distorts political accountability by obscuring whether
lawmakers have enacted policies that impact the expected course of the law.134
In the context of enforcing budget rules, however, consistency and coherence
remain essential. In many respects, the official baseline in its current form
remains superior from that standpoint, with a set of bright line rules that have
generated bipartisan agreement. Yet it too is susceptible to gamesmanship if
lawmakers toggle between it and a current policy baseline. To reduce that
vulnerability, it is tempting to simply reform the baseline to score temporary
provisions as permanent ones. As Kamin recognizes, this would be overinclusive, capturing policies truly meant to be temporary. Prescribing a carve-out
to be exercised at the lawmakers’ option, however, does not cure the problem—
it is susceptible to the very gamesmanship that the expectations baseline seeks to
prevent.
In prior work, I have discussed how sunset provisions attached to tax cuts and
borne out of the budget process should be looked upon with skepticism from a
policy perspective, in part because of the budgetary pathologies they produce.135
Applying this policy presumption to the baseline context, we could refine the
official baseline. A new rule could assume provisions are temporary unless they
were enacted for budgetary reasons; that is, unless they were enacted through a
reconciliation bill. This scoring rule would be easy to apply and would not require
judgment on the part of the estimators. It should also track expectations well
enough that there would be no need for a carveout that would create room for
subterfuge by lawmakers.
Although it is certainly possible that Congress could enact truly temporary
policies through reconciliation to address an economic downturn or other
emergency, there is a strong presumption that, in the reconciliation context, the
sunset was enacted to avoid the Byrd Rule and thus would not be truly intended
to be temporary. There would, in other words, be no independent justification,
outside of the budget process, for the sunset. Such a baseline rule could also be
critiqued for being under-inclusive since some temporary provisions outside the
reconciliation process are indeed meant to be permanent.

132. For discussion of the critiques of the official baseline, see Jared Shirck & Francis Shen, The Role
of Estimation in Budget Procedures: Baselines, HARV. L. SCH. FED. BUDGET POL’Y SEMINAR 16–18
(2005).
133. See Kamin, supra note 40, at 191.
134. Id.
135. Kysar, supra note 107, at 1065–66.
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The proposed reform would sacrifice potential over- and under-inclusion for
the sake of clarity and reigning in gamesmanship, while also attempting to better
align the baseline with the future expected course of policy. However, there are
some practical hurdles to adopting such a baseline change. If temporary
legislation is scored as permanent, then this would violate the Byrd Rule
prohibition against increasing the deficit beyond the budget window, making the
reconciliation vehicle unavailable for most tax cuts. This highlights one major
difficulty with changing the baseline to address temporary legislation—it is
fraught with politics over the desirability and size of tax cuts. Although far from
ideal, the current official baseline at least represents a set of rules that have
heretofore been agreed upon by the parties, which is partly why a shift to a
current policy baseline would be so significant.
Because of the politics over tax cuts and the ambiguity introduced in defining
a current policy baseline, maintaining the current law baseline might be the least
imperiled option. Although lawmakers lose some information on costs upfront
by using that baseline, the budget estimators and think tanks can also continue to
supplement the official baseline with alternative projections of what the budget
landscape looks like if the assumptions over temporary legislation turn out to be
unreasonable. Although the official current law baseline would be used to assist
in enforcing budgetary targets, these alternative baselines would be available to
fulfill other goals, such as facilitating private and public planning.
Since the current law baseline is arguably superior from a gamesmanship
standpoint due to its objective grounding in the statute rather than an amorphous
judgment about what constitutes current policy, it is particularly well-suited for
the budget rule context. For purposes of the official baseline, there is a need for
a baseline with as little ambiguity as possible in order to lessen the inevitable
partisan disputes about the budget estimates. A current policy baseline’s more
nuanced, contextualized depiction of the nation’s fiscal future might provide
more realism, but it loses certainty as a result. As a result, it might be best suited
for an unofficial role in the budget process.
Whatever path is chosen, bipartisan agreement over how to refine the
baseline is essential; a baseline must be a neutral benchmark against which policy
changes are measured. Simply deferring to the majority on what constitutes
current policy and when that baseline applies is a recipe for gamesmanship.
Above all, inconsistent toggling between baselines undermines the integrity of
the budget process and destabilizes the budget rules generally. Emphasizing this
point is worthwhile since shaming the parties over their inconsistent baseline
usage is likely more politically expedient than attempting baseline reform.
4. The Role of the Estimators
a. Controversy Over the Estimators. The 2017 budget process also
unleashed criticism of the budget estimators, questioning their credibility and
encroaching upon their independence. These criticisms began in conjunction with
health care reform. In the spring of 2017, CBO prepared its analysis of the House
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Republican plan to repeal and replace the ACA. During that time, the White
House Press Secretary Sean Spicer began criticizing the reliability of CBO’s track
record.136 After CBO estimated that the House bill would result in 23 million
people losing health insurance, OMB Director Mick Mulvaney described the
scoring as “absurd” and went on the question the continued relevance of CBO
and whether it was truly independent:
At some point, you’ve got to ask yourself, has the day of the CBO come and gone? . . .
[I]s it really feasible to think of that as a nonpartisan organization? . . . To defer to them,
I think is giving them way too much authority. Certainly there is value in having that
information, especially if they could return to their nonpartisan roots. But at the same
time you can function, you can have a government, without a Congressional Budget
Office.137

Mulvaney also suggested that, instead of deferring to CBO, lawmakers could rely
on scoring from OMB and think tanks. These attacks on CBO escalated in the
summer of 2017, when the healthcare repeal efforts faced increasing opposition.
White House Aides called the CBO analysis of the health care plan “little more
than fake news,” urging Congress to give it “little weight.”138
Republicans tried shifting gears abruptly. Rather than waiting for a CBO
score on one such alternative plan, Republicans considered enlisting the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to score a new amendment
pushed by Senator Ted Cruz. The amendment would allow stripped down health
care plans to be eligible for premium tax credits.139 This move would have been
unprecedented, substituting analysis from a part of the executive branch that was
supportive of the bill’s passage.140 It was an open question whether the alternative
score could be used as the official score in meeting the requirements of
reconciliation. The HHS produced detailed analyses of the Cruz amendment,
which were attacked as misguided and opaque by various experts.141 Unlike other
analyses of the Cruz amendment, HHS’s analysis concluded that it would reduce

136. Alan Rappeport, White House Casts Pre-Emptive Doubt on Congressional Budget Office, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 9, 2017), https://mobile.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/us/politics/cbo-congressional-budgetoffice-american-health-care-act.html?hp&_r=0&referer=https://www.nytimes.com/
[https://perma.cc/AN25-GMMJ].
137. Philip Klein, The Day of the CBO “has finally come and gone,” WASH. EXAMINER (May 31,
2017),
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/mick-mulvaney-the-day-of-the-cbo-has-probably-comeand-gone/article/2624609 [https://perma.cc/AGQ9-NW9P].
138. Marc Short & Brian Blase, The Fundamental Error in the CBO’s Health Care Projections, WASH.
POST (July 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-fundamental-error-in-the-cboshealth-care-projections/2017/07/14/25f0d8a4-67ee-11e7-a1d7-9a32c91c6f40_story.html?utm_term=.
87af86191064 [https://perma.cc/UF72-9LXR].
139. Haley Byrd, Senate Republicans Considering Alternative Scoring for Cruz Amendment Instead
of Waiting for CBO, INDEP. J. REV. (July 13, 2017), http://ijr.com/2017/07/919440-senate-republicansconsidering-alternative-scoring-cruz-amendment-instead-waiting-cbo/ [https://perma.cc/JS3H-2PPC].
140. M.J. Lee et al., Health Care State of Play: McConnell Puts Bill on Ice After Losing McCain’s
‘Yes’ Vote for Now, CNN (July 17, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/17/politics/health-care-state-ofplay/index.html [https://perma.cc/98QR-6K8W].
141. Vann R. Newkirk II, The GOP Escalates its Battle with the CBO, THE ATLANTIC (July 22, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/07/republicans-cbo-hhs-score-bcra/534480/
[https://perma.cc/4KMA-FYR7].
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health insurance premiums and encourage greater coverage. Republicans
eventually discarded plans to use the HHS score.142 Since the Cruz amendment
had not been scored by CBO, it had to overcome a point of order but did not
secure the requisite sixty votes.143
During the first half of 2017, Republican criticism against CBO was so intense
that eight former CBO directors wrote a letter to congressional leaders objecting
to the attacks.144 The battle escalated when House Republicans introduced three
amendments that would severely weaken the agency, eliminating the Budget
Analysis Division and reducing staff by at least one-third.145 One such
amendment would have turned CBO into an aggregator of scores, gathering data
from several think tanks—the Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise
Institute, the Brookings Institution, and the Urban Institute. It is unclear how
such a system would work. The think tanks would have to disclose donors and
subject themselves to government oversight. It is also unclear whether the think
tanks would even assent to such a role and how the reform would be implemented
given that the analyses from think tanks are often derived from the CBO
baseline. The House resoundingly rejected the amendments but efforts to
discredit CBO lingered.146
When Republicans failed to overhaul the ACA, they began to pivot to tax
reform and controversy over the budget process continued in that context. Using
reconciliation to enact tax law places ultimate pressure on the budget estimates
since the legislation must comply with the deficit-neutral safeguards of the Byrd
Rule. One early signal indicating an attempt to reduce the influence of the
estimators was a rule change made by Senate Republicans in the budget
resolution, which repealed an existing rule that required a CBO estimate to be
publicly available twenty-eight hours prior to a vote for bills reported out of
committee.147 Presumably the aim was to set up the tax bill so that it did not need
an official score from CBO and JCT, and instead allow lawmakers the flexibility
to use a score from Treasury for purposes of enforcing the rules of
142. Vann R. Newkirk II, Making Sense of the Obamacare Repeal Process, THE ATLANTIC (July 26,
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/07/trying-to-make-sense-of-whats-happeningsenate-reconciliation/534942/ [https://perma.cc/99BM-T94H].
143. Russell Berman, Senate Republicans Clear Key Health-Care Hurdle, THE ATLANTIC (July 25,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/07/senate-republicans-clear-key-health-carehurdle/534861/ [https://perma.cc/B56M-WJJU].
144. Letter from Former CBO Directors on the Importance of CBO’s Role in the Legislative Process
to Paul Ryan, Speaker of the House, et al. (July 21, 2017) (on file at https://medium.com/
@douglas.elmendorf/letter-from-former-cbo-directors-on-the-importance-of-cbos-role-in-thelegislative-process-278863b7e1c6 [https://perma.cc/NQ6N-MNXB]).
145. See Make America Secure Appropriations Act, 2018, Hearing on H.R. 3219 before the Rules
Committee, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2018) (Amendment 19 proposed by Reps. Griffith, Jordan, Meadows,
Perry, Amendment 21 proposed by Reps. Perry, Jordan, Meadows, Amendment 26 proposed by Rep.
Perry).
146. Jonathan Nicholson, House Rejects Two Amendments Aimed at Trimming CBO Budget,
BLOOMBERG BNA (July 27, 2017), https://www.bna.com/house-rejects-two-b73014462351/ [https://
perma.cc/8ERH-WEQK]. The House only considered two of the amendments—one was held back.
147. H.R. Con. Res. 71, 115th Congress § 4111 (2017) (budget resolution).
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reconciliation.148
Rankle over the incidence of the corporate tax also pitted the Trump
administration and certain Congressional Republicans against traditional career
analysts in the government. The cutting of the corporate tax rate was a long-time
goal of Republicans but one in tension with promises to prioritize tax cuts for the
middle class. Official estimates from CBO and Treasury concluded that 75–82%
of the corporate tax is borne by owners of capital, with labor contributing to the
rest.149 In the media, however, Mnuchin countered such statistics, including those
from his own staff at Treasury, and argued that 70–80% of the corporate tax is
actually paid by workers.150 Other Republican leaders, including Senate Finance
Chairman Orrin Hatch, echoed Mnuchin’s view that a lower corporate tax would
predominantly benefit laborers. The controversy culminated in Treasury taking
the unprecedented step of removing its prior study contradicting the
administration’s current view from its website.151
Another area of contention in the 2017 process was the amount of growth
attributable to tax cuts. Early on in the tax reform process, the White House took
an aggressive stance on how much economic growth from the tax cuts could be
expected and also attempted to undermine the official estimates from JCT. The
Trump Administration’s 2018 budget assumed that their proposed cuts would
generate an additional $2.1 trillion, essentially paying for themselves. Secretary
Mnuchin suggested during one interview that the dynamic estimates produced by
JCT might not necessarily be the ones used for official scoring.152 In the initial
version of the budget resolution, the House Budget Committee reined in the
White House’s ambitious predictions, limiting the amount of revenues produced
by dynamic scoring to only $300 million. Still, the White House’s refutation of
JCT as ultimate authority on the subject was a notable development.
In recent years, Congress made rule changes instructing CBO and JCT to
dynamically score certain legislation. The methodologies in estimating
macroeconomic feedbacks remain contestable though. Additionally, the Senate
Parliamentarian reportedly disallowed using dynamic scoring for
148. See David Kamin (@davidckamin), TWITTER (Sept. 29, 2017, 10:57 AM),
https://twitter.com/davidckamin/status/913825150080110592 [https://perma.cc/9RC6-G9YV].
149. Jennifer Gravelle, Corporate Tax Incidence: A Review of Empirical Estimates and Analysis
(Cong. Budget Off. Working Paper 2011-01, June 2011).
150. Richard Rubin, Who Ultimately Pays for Corporate Taxes? The Answer May Color the
Republican Overhaul, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/who-ultimately-pays-forcorporate-taxes-the-answer-may-color-the-republican-overhaul-1502184603.
151. Richard Rubin, Treasury Removes Paper at Odds with Mnuchin’s Take on Corporate-Tax Cut’s
Winners, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/treasury-removes-paper-at-oddswith-mnuchins-take-on-corporate-tax-cuts-winners-1506638463.
152. “This Week” Transcript 7-9-17: Steven Mnuchin, Sen. Ted Cruz, and Walter Shaub, ABC NEWS
(July 9, 2017), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/week-transcript-17-steven-mnuchin-sen-ted-cruz/story?
id=48521537 [https://perma.cc/LJ63-S7FW] (quoting Treasury Secretary Mnuchin: “[W]ith our
projections, you create over $2 trillion of additional revenues. So it will be paid for over ten years. The
question is whether we’ll get credit for all of that under the—under the current models of the joint tax
commission [sic]. And, again, that’s one of the things that’s under negotiations that we’re discussing right
now with leadership.”)
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reconciliation.153 The Parliamentarian’s rational may have been because the Byrd
Rule is enforced on a provision-by-provision basis and dynamic scores are given
on the entire bill. Another issue is that the Senate requires one official revenue
score for reconciliation legislation. For dynamic scores, the estimators judge a
bill’s cost assuming no macroeconomic changes and then add those changes in,
thereby arguably producing two revenue scores. Both of these obstacles seem
surmountable. The dynamic effects could for instance be distributed across
provisions using an ordering rule. Although admittedly arbitrary, such a rule
would not be unprecedented in the scorekeeping context. Also, although the
dynamic effects could be separated out as a line item, the estimators could
designate the dynamic score as the official score.154
In truth, there was probably little will to strong arm the Parliamentarian on
these points since the dynamic scores ultimately did not bring in much additional
revenue due to the negative impact on growth from the bill’s addition to the
national debt.155 JCT’s official dynamic score of the Senate tax bill estimated $407
billion of budgetary feedback, reducing net costs to just over $1 trillion over the
budget window period. JCT projected a similar figure for the House and
conference bills.156
Despite the fact that JCT’s conclusion that the tax cut would not pay for itself
was echoed by multiple think tanks including the conservative Tax Foundation,
Republicans mounted a campaign to discredit JCT’s analysis. Party leaders
circulated a memorandum declaring the JCT’s growth estimate “suspect” and
“consistently wrong,” while also attacking JCT’s revenue analyses in general as
having been “off to the tune of more than $1.5 trillion over ten years.” Majority
leader Mitch McConnell concluded that, in spite of the JCT analysis, TCJA was
a “revenue-neutral bill.”157
In the end, Congress ultimately adhered to JCT’s conventional analysis of the
tax bill. Did JCT, then, emerge from the process with its reputation intact?
Perhaps largely so, but the process, and the political rhetoric lodged at JCT, can
teach us about some of the institution’s vulnerabilities going forward.

153. Daniel Clifton, How Tax Reform Will Play Out This Fall, BARRON’S (Oct. 3, 2017),
https://www.barrons.com/articles/how-tax-reform-will-play-out-this-fall-1507057230
[https://perma.cc/D34M-H2NC].
154. Thanks to David Kamin for this analysis.
155. For a discussion of current approaches to dynamic scoring, see generally Auerbach et al.,
Macroeconomic Modeling of Tax Policy: A Comparison of Current Methodologies, 70 NAT’L TAX J. 819
(2017).
156. The House bill was passed two weeks after its introduction, and JCT could not produce a
dynamic analysis in time. JCT’s chief of staff, Thomas A. Barthold, suspended work on the House
analysis to turn to the Senate bill so that such an analysis could be provided before a Senate vote. After
the Senate vote on its bill, the JCT provided a dynamic analysis of the House bill. STAFF OF J. COMM.
TAX’N, JCX-66-17, 115TH CONG., MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE “TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT”
AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON NOVEMBER 16, 2017 (Comm. Print 2017).
157. Jim Tankersley, Republicans Sought to Undercut an Unfavorable Analysis of the Tax Plan, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/04/us/politics/republicans-joint-committee-ontaxation-estimate.html [https://perma.cc/KC9B-65DT].
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b. The Role of the Estimators Going Forward. Conclusions about the
incidence of the corporate tax or the macroeconomic growth effects of tax cuts
are not easily drawn. Although the dynamic analysis did not prove terribly useful
to the GOP—in fact they did not wait for it before voting on the conference
bill158—JCT’s macroeconomic analysis was corroborated by several think tanks
and private-sector economists. Going forward, however, the dynamic estimates
will continue to be a flash point. Many shortcomings of the models have been
pointed out. For instance, they do not incorporate strategic responses by other
countries and hence did not account for the fact that other countries will drop
their corporate tax rates to compete with the new lower U.S. corporate rate,
reducing investment here.159 Additionally, because deficits are outpacing growth,
dynamic analyses must infer future fiscal policy in an unspecified manner.160
Further, dynamic estimates have the tendency to exacerbate the tendencies in the
legislative process towards privileging the short term. Although a bill might spur
growth effects within the budget window, these might occur in exchange for lower
growth in the long-run.161
The dynamic score is just one area of controversy among many. But it shows
the difficult task for JCT going forward, especially with so much riding on the
revenue scores for purposes of reconciliation. Although the estimators and their
staff have earned their well-deserved reputation of impartiality, reforms might
assist in diffusing some of the tension over the estimators’ role. One promising
reform option has been recently proposed in a bill entitled the “CBO Show Your
Work Act.” The bill would, true to its name, require that CBO adhere to
publishing the data, models, and data preparation routine it uses in preparing its
estimates.162 This reform would allow lawmakers and policy analysts to more fully
grasp CBO’s methodologies, making possible replication of those methodologies
and tweaking of its assumptions. Opening up the estimating process would also
allow experts outside of CBO to make suggestions for improving it.163 JCT could
also follow this approach. This would allow for better understanding of some of
the assumptions underlying the dynamic estimates and subsequent improvement

158. For the dynamic estimate of the conference bill, see MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE
CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R.1, supra note 68. It was released on December 22, 2017, the same
day the President signed the bill into law and a few days after it was passed by Congress.
159. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah et. al., The Games They Will Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, and
Glitches Under the New Legislation 23 (Dec. 18, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3084187 [https://perma.cc/4VAC-UUV4].
160. Ed Kleinbard, Perversion of the Tax Policymaking Process (USC CLASS Research Papers
Series No. CLASS18-1, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3112866 [https://
perma.cc/3R46-ZKBP].
161. See Dan Shaviro, Greg Leiserson on Dynamic Scoring Part 2, START MAKING SENSE BLOG
(Jan. 17, 2018), http://danshaviro.blogspot.com/2018/01/2018-nyu-tax-policy-colloquium-greg_17.html
[https://perma.cc/VR73-5MKQ].
162. CBO Show Your Work Act, S. 1746, 115th Cong (2017).
163. Yuval Levin, Some Transparency for CBO, NAT’L REV. (Aug. 10, 2017),
http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/450368/cbo-should-show-its-work-yuval-levin
[https://perma.cc/GHN6-ZQPH].
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of them.
Another idea is for CBO and JCT to open up their estimating processes to
produce range estimates, instead of point projections, allowing participants in the
lawmaking process to better assess the agency’s confidence levels and the
plausible spectrum of end results. To be sure, there are practical difficulties in
producing range estimates. Often times, the estimators may simply be unable to
produce measures of uncertainty because they are not using formal probability
models in producing their estimates or are relying upon a limited number of
studies.164 But when such levels of uncertainty can be measured, the estimators
may do more harm than good by holding them back.
In 2014, then-CBO Director Douglas Elmendorf made the point that even
when CBO can quantify uncertainty it is not always wise to do so.165 Budget rules,
after all, require point estimates, and it is unclear how legislators would respond
to range estimates, perhaps seizing upon only those parts of the range that
support their policy preference.166 Although the enforcement mechanisms of
budget rules do not lend themselves to accommodating range estimates, this does
not mean such estimates have no place in the lawmaking process. The range
estimates could instead be provided as a supplement to the official point estimate.
Elmendorf may be right to worry that politicians may use one end of the range
to their advantage, but this concern is likely outweighed by the benefits provided
by more openness regarding the limitations in the estimators’ analyses. Together,
these reforms could go a long way toward restoring the legitimacy of the
embattled institutions.
5. Impact on Tax Policy
Thus far, the discussion has been on how the 2017 tax legislation has
challenged the budget process, but what about the effects of the budget process
on the tax legislation? Budget numbers, of course, heavily shaped the contours
of the bill and the scope of its provisions. In order to fit the chosen policies within
the $1.5 trillion deficit-increasing limit set forth in the budget resolution and to
comply with the Byrd Rule, Republicans had to deviate from their initial plans.
They cut back on the scope of the pass-through incentives, sunsetted most of the
individual cuts in 2025, increased rates on a one-time international repatriation,
increased taxation of certain foreign corporate income in future years, and raised
the new corporate rate from 20% to 21%.
Budget pressures also affected the bill in other ways. Using reconciliation to
bypass supermajority rules meant that Republicans did not need to secure even
one Democratic vote, making for less moderate, and hence less stable policy. For
instance, Republicans chose a permanent and deep corporate rate cut while
providing only temporary relief to individuals—a policy tradeoff that would have
164. Doug Elmendorf, Communicating the Uncertainty of CBO’s Estimates, CONG. BUDGET OFF.
BLOG (Dec. 15, 2014), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/49860 [https://perma.cc/F7ZB-AFS8].
165. Id.
166. Id.
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looked much different in bipartisan legislation. Past tax overhauls have involved
support from the minority party—even the Bush tax cuts drew the votes of twelve
Democratic Senators. The exclusion of the minority party means that Democrats
will be more likely to repeal the legislation when they become the majority.
Although the Byrd Rule tempers the tendency towards extreme legislation
somewhat by requiring legislation to be deficit-neutral in the out-years, the use
of temporary legislation in turn undermines this tempering effect by allowing
more extreme legislation to pass through the reconciliation process so long as it
is sunsetted. The many sunset provisions in TCJA will themselves further
destabilize the legislation going forward.
The reconciliation vehicle also made the achievement of “true” tax reform
less likely. This is because if both parties share the blame of taking away special
tax benefits, doing so becomes much easier. Compared with the 1986 reform, the
2017 legislation had relatively few base broadening measures, eliminating only
one tax expenditure of JCT’s list of such provisions. Although the revenue
pressures of reconciliation can force some difficult choices, the availability of
budget gimmicks and sunsets overall reduced the need for revenue offsets. The
limited amendments and debate required under reconciliation also exacerbated
an already hasty process. This contributed to mistakes and loopholes in the
legislation that will present challenges for the IRS in implementing the legislation
and for taxpayers in planning their affairs.167
Finally, although reconciliation has elevated the importance of JCT’s role as
revenue estimator, in many ways this has come at the cost of reducing its
influence in developing the substance of tax bills. Lacking JCT’s expertise and
input, the legislative outcome is arguably inferior as compared to an era when
JCT’s policy impact was ascendant.168
IV.
THE FUTURE OF THE BUDGET PROCESS?
In recent years, the budget process has been severely tested by the increasing
use of reconciliation for major policy initiatives, which the process was never
intended to accommodate. The budget process developments of 2017 have shown
important areas of vulnerabilities. Although the norms and institutions
ultimately held, they arguably suffered damage during the process. The sunsets
of the 2017 bill will lead to more budget gamesmanship going forward. Party
polarization will continue to make reconciliation powerful, thereby putting
immense pressure on the estimates and the estimators. This discussion has
proposed smaller changes that could help restore those aspects of the budget
process that have been challenged, but it is also worthwhile to consider more
167. See supra note 159, at 24.
168. Thanks to Vic Fleischer and George Yin for this point. For an excellent overview on the history
of the Joint Committee on Taxation, see George K. Yin, Codification of the Tax Law and the Emergence
of the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (U. Va. L. & Econ. Research Paper Series No. 2017-20,
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3008878 [https://perma.cc/7KNY-8UPA].
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substantial changes to the budget process.
These breakdowns in the budget process underscore a fundamental condition
of the budget process—its endogeneity. Because the non-enforcement problem
is seemingly inherent to all current budgeting tools, any solution to it must
involve a fundamental rethinking of the budget process. In conjunction with
improved procedural rules, budgetary constraints could be built into the
substance of the law so that Congress cannot easily elude them. For instance, tax
laws could be pegged to a particular revenue goal, automatically adjusting to
ensure that target is met.169 This “trigger” would elevate the status of budgetary
goals from simply process rules but without the need for constitutional action,
like a balanced budget amendment.
Similar measures have been utilized at the state level.170 Senate deficit hawks
also tried such an approach, proposing to roll back the tax cuts in TCJA if the
law’s deficit impact turned out to be worse than advertised.171 Design, however,
is important for any such budgetary device,172 and triggers should not be used in
a symbolic fashion to justify unaffordable tax cuts. For instance, the targets
contemplated in the TCJA trigger were too modest in comparison to the huge
revenue losses of the bill, making up for only about 10% of the bill’s increase to
the debt in the budget window period.173
Automatically adjusting laws and processes in general may also help to
overcome the status quo bias in the legislative process, which is worsened by
party polarization. They might also help to overcome the cliffs, sequesters,
shutdowns, and other emergency forms of lawmaking that have come to
characterize the modern budget process.174 Default budgets, for instance, could
be employed to apply when lawmakers are unable to pass a budget (or when they
pass only a shell budget).175

169. See Rebecca M. Kysar, Legislation (Mar. 6, 2018) (working draft) (on file with author).
170. Jared Walczak, Designing Tax Triggers: Lessons from the States, TAX FOUND. (Sept. 7, 2016),
https://taxfoundation.org/designing-tax-triggers-lessons-states/ [https://perma.cc/DGH7-WXBK].
171. The Senate Parliamentarian scuttled this plan, ruling that the trigger did not meet Byrd Rule
requirements because it did not have a budgetary impact. Jacob Pramuk, Senate GOP Rushes to Change
Tax Bill as Setback Hits Hours Before Vote, CNBC (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/
11/30/parliamentarian-says-revenue-trigger-in-gop-tax-plan-will-not-work-under-rules-of-senate.html
[https://perma.cc/2RRF-66PC].
172. For instance, in 2014, Oklahoma tied tax cuts to estimated revenues as opposed to actual
revenues, causing tax cuts to be triggered even though the state’s deficits were rapidly increasing. Richard
C. Auxier, A Tale of Two Tax Triggers, TAXVOX BLOG: TAX POL’Y CTR. (May 17, 2017),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/tale-two-tax-triggers [https://perma.cc/KGZ9-KJ7C]. Particular
care should also be taken so that the trigger mechanism does not become an anti-stimulus measure during
an economic downturn.
173. David Kamin, Will the Trigger Make Only a Small Dent in the Debt?, MEDIUM (Nov. 29, 2017),
https://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/will-the-trigger-make-only-a-small-dent-in-the-debte9c7568256fa [https://perma.cc/VQN8-VSUA].
174. Kysar, supra note 169.
175. David Scott Louk & David Gamage, Preventing Government Shutdowns: Designing Default
Rules for Budgets, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 182, 185–86 (2015).
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Finally, if the Senate abolishes the legislative filibuster it will have major
consequences for the budget process. Given the policy distortions reconciliation
creates due to its sometimes arcane rules, one might question whether
reconciliation is the right vehicle for major policy initiatives, a point which I have
argued in the past.176 Using reconciliation as the main vehicle for tax legislation
often results in poor tax policy because its constraints supplant norms such as
simplicity, fairness, and efficiency. Additionally, reconciliation has hijacked the
budget process in order to achieve these policy initiatives and little with regard
to true budgeting can be accomplished as a result. A good example of this is the
Fiscal Year 2017 budget resolution, which only contained reconciliation
instructions for healthcare repeal and omitted all other spending priorities.177
Lastly, reconciliation has also effectively “weaponized” the budget process, with
the majority party using its instruments to weight the legislative process in its
favor.178
In these respects, the nuclear option would be a welcome development since
reconciliation would no longer be necessary to pass major policy initiatives. But
getting rid of the filibuster will also produce more extreme legislation, including
in contexts beyond those available currently in the reconciliation process. Under
these conditions, partisan legislation and policy instability may very well become
the new normal.
Importantly, the nuclear option will also render the Byrd Rule’s protections
for long-term fiscal prudence meaningless, since the rule will have no teeth in a
world without the filibuster. Whatever one’s view of simple majority rule, this
would be an unfortunate development, impeding the ability of lawmakers to take
into account long-term fiscal interests. Many features of the budget process in
fact do not discourage, and even encourage, this tendency—features like the tenyear budget window. By focusing explicitly on the period beyond the budget
window period, the Byrd Rule attempts to guard the long-term fiscal health of
the nation
Any proposal to change Senate voting rules, then, must be weighed not only
as a choice between the protection of the majority party as against the minority,
but of current generations as against future ones. Likewise, the attempts in 2017
to circumvent the Byrd Rule—through maneuvers like shifting to a current policy
baseline—should be judged as jeopardizing the interests of those future
generations. Of course, another option would be to undo the “original sin” of
reconciliation by restoring it to only apply to deficit-decreasing legislation.
Although similar reforms by Democrats have thus far proven unstable, the dismal
fiscal outlook and each party’s failure to contain the debt unilaterally may finally
176. Kysar, supra note 6.
177. S. Con. Res. 3, 115th Cong. (2017).
178. See Dan Shaviro, Greg Leiserson on Dynamic Scoring Part 2, START MAKING SENSE BLOG
(Jan. 17, 2018), http://danshaviro.blogspot.com/2018/01/2018-nyu-tax-policy-colloquium-greg_17.html
[https://perma.cc/SF8W-5Q9N] (discussing the weaponization of dynamic scoring). Shaviro argues that,
in comparison with the left, the right has more effectively used the budget process to advance their
substantive policies, an observation with which I do not disagree.
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provide the impetus for the parties to work toward fiscal stability in a bipartisan
manner.
V
CONCLUSION
In one retelling of the 2017 tax legislative process story, budget rules were
largely maintained, giving hope for their resiliency. Upon further scrutiny, there
is reason to doubt this account since proponents of the tax bill were able to secure
many of the benefits of proposed process changes informally. The debate over
certain aspects of the budget process illustrates many of the process’s
vulnerabilities—budget windows, baselines, and the independence of the
estimators—that will likely be under continued pressure. Given the instability of
the regime, it is worth taking the opportunity to reflect on which of those aspects
are deserving of reform and the possible trajectory going forward. This Article
has suggested how to analyze changes in those contexts, as well as providing
avenues for more ambitious rethinking of the budget process. Such budget
reforms, however, must be examined in light of possible changes to the Senate
filibuster, and vice versa.

